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Abstract 
 
 This experiment investigated the impact of status differences between subordinates and 
face-to-face coalition negotiations on insurgent coalitional action. The effects of these variables 
were examined in stratified groups, where a leader established inequitable pay-rates, and 
subordinates could coalesce and destroy a portion of the leader’s outcomes. The results showed 
that status differences (as opposed to status similarity) undermined the sense of common 
interests between subordinates and reduced the severity of coalitional action against the leader. 
Face-to-face negotiations engendered a more cautious approach to coalition negotiations and also 
reduced the severity of insurgent action. The results suggest that status differences pose an 
“organizational problem” for subordinates attempting to mobilize action against a leader. 
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 Dahrendorf (1959), in his neo-Marxist theory of social stratification, argues that authority 
relations inherently foster two opposing “quasi groups.” A quasi group refers to an aggregate of 
persons in a relatively common situation with respect to the distribution of authority. Those in 
authority positions (i.e., superordinates) represent one quasi group, while subordinates compose 
the second quasi group. According to Dahrendorf, the interests of these two quasi groups are 
inevitably opposed, but overt conflict occurs only when these interests lead to a coalition (i.e., 
“interest group”) explicitly organized to influence authorities. This poses an important research 
question: under what conditions will a subordinate quasi group be transformed into a coalition 
(i.e., interest group) opposing authorities? The present study addresses this question in the 
context of a laboratory experiment on “revolutionary” coalitions. As in related experimental 
work, a revolutionary coalition is broadly defined as joint action by two or more subordinates 
against a group leader (Caplow, 1968; Michener and Lawler, 1971; Michener and Lyons, 1972; 
Lawler, 1975). 
 The focus on revolutionary coalitions in stratified groups distinguishes this study from 
most coalition research. In general, coalition research has examined how persons choose between 
alternative coalitions in situations where coalitions are necessary for persons to attain outcomes 
(see Gamson, 1964; Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973, for reviews). In the present study, two 
subordinates in a three-person group are treated inequitably by a group leader, and subordinates 
have the option of coalescing against the leader. A coalition is not necessary for subordinates to 
attain outcomes, but is an influence strategy which destroys leader outcomes and may induce 
him to establish more equitable pay-rates. 
 Dahrendorf (1959: 182-189) elucidates three general conditions that might engender 
coalitions or interest groups between subordinates: technical, political, and organizational 
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conditions. Technical conditions essentially involve values and goals around which subordinates 
might organize and which provide tire normative justification for subordinate action against 
leaders. Political conditions concern the efficacy of the coalition (e.g., its potential power and 
likelihood of success) and the capability of leaders to repress insurgent action. Organizational 
conditions bear on the difficulty of subordinates actually mobilizing joint action (e.g., ease of 
communication, relative status of subordinates in the group). According to Dahrendorf, these 
general conditions may affect the actual formation of subordinate coalitions and/or the severity 
or “violence” of coalitional action undertaken by subordinates.1 The present study investigates 
factors that fall within the general rubric “organizational conditions.” 
 Specifically, this study is concerned with the impact of status differences between 
subordinates on the frequency and severity of coalitional action against a group leader. It is 
generally assumed that persons with different status in a group have more difficulty coalescing 
than do persons with similar status. However, a recent experimental study failed to support this 
notion (Lawler, 1975). In that study, two subordinates in a three-person group were confronted 
with an equitable or inequitable reward distribution. In one condition, the two subordinates had 
the same status level in the group; while in the second condition, they occupied different status 
levels. The results of the study revealed than an inequitable reward distribution engendered more 
frequent and more severe coalitional action by subordinates, while status differences between 
subordinates did not constrain such coalitional action. 
                                                          
1 To Dahrendorf (1959: 212), “violence” refers to a continuum of hostile action ranging from 
discussion and debate, to competition and strikes, to civil war. His' notion of violence is 
comparable to the “severity” of coalitional action in the present study, which represents different 
amounts of damage levied on the group leader. 
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 There are two plausible reasons for the failure of the status hypothesis in this prior study. 
First, the inequity was extreme, and it apparently aroused a strong sense of common fate between 
subordinates irrespective of any status differences. Second, the coalition negotiations were held 
in a face-to-face context, which may have heightened the “self-presentational” aspects of the 
negotiations and thereby weakened the resistance of the higher status subordinate to an insurgent 
coalition. The present study addresses these issues and extends the Lawler (1975) research by 
examining the impact of status differences under conditions of “low” inequity, with the 
expectation that status differences will inhibit coalitional agreements where the normative 
pressure of inequity is mild. This status hypothesis will be investigated under two forms of 
communication between subordinates: face-to-face versus verbal, without face-to-face, 
communication. Each of these independent variables is discussed below. 
 Status differences. Some coalition research supports the notion that resource differences 
exacerbate conflict within an alliance and thereby hamper coalitional action (e.g., Vitz and Kite, 
1970; Barker and Janseiwicz, 1970; Nitz and Phillips, 1969). Vitz and Kite (1970), in a study 
particularly relevant to the present one, found that discord within an internation alliance was 
greatest where resource differences between allies were moderate and lowest where such 
differences were small. This conflict had the effect of reducing the fortifications of the coalition 
against a threatening adversary. Aside from extending the study by Lawler (1975), the present 
study will provide information on whether the Vitz and Kite (1970) findings on resource 
differences in an internation setting generalize to status differences within hierarchically 
differentiated groups. As in some recent coalition research (Michener and Lawler, 1971; 
Michener and Lyons, .1972; Lawler, 1975), status represents a person’s • position in a larger 
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structure and not a resource input to the coalition as in most coalition research (Gamson, 1964; 
Caplow, 1968; Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973). 
 Status in the present study refers to a person’s rank on three hierarchical dimensions: 
performance, control, and rewards. Persons with different status have different levels of task 
expertise and different amounts of control over the group’s task decisions, and they receive a 
disparate proportion of the group’s outcomes. With status differences, subordinates may 
anticipate a possible conflict of interest. The higher status subordinate may be reluctant to 
coalesce because his group status affords him greater outcomes than the other subordinate, and 
he therefore has more to lose and less to gain from a coalition. The lower status subordinate, 
recognizing this potential conflict of interest, may expect less support for coalitional action from 
the higher status subordinate, and this may depress his inclination toward coalitional action. 
Research does indicate that expectations of little support from others for a coalition reduce one’s 
proclivity toward insurgent action (Michener and Lyons, 1972; Lawler, 1975). Based on the 
foregoing reasoning, one would expect status differences to weaken the common interests of 
subordinates and to reduce the frequency and/or severity of coalitional action. 
 Form of communication. The effect of status differences may depend on the form of 
communication between subordinates. This research is concerned with the impact of face-to-face 
negotiations and includes two specific forms of communication: face-to-face versus verbal 
without face-to-face. As Goffman (1959, 1963) suggests, face-to-face interaction sensitizes 
people to the impressions they “give off” to others. Applied to the present study, face-to-face 
communication may enhance the salience of self-presentations, and thereby specify the effect of 
status differences. The higher status subordinate in the status difference condition may believe 
his interests militate against coalitional action, but also may expect pressure from the lower 
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status subordinate to coalesce against the leader. His presentation of self may be problematic, for 
he might appear egotistical or selfish if he strongly resists coalitional action. Some research in 
prisoner’s dilemma settings indicates that face-to-face communication induces greater 
cooperation than verbal communication without face-to-face contact (Wichman, 1970); 
similarly, in the present study, face-to-face communication with the lower status subordinate 
may lead the higher status subordinate to partake more readily in a coalition. By doing so, he 
may jeopardize his share of the group’s outcomes, but may establish a favorable "face” vis-a-vis 
the other subordinate. The importance of such intangible rewards is documented by research 
indicating that persons will forego tangible rewards to save or maintain face (Brown, 1968). This 
reasoning suggests a status-by-form-of-communication interaction effect indicating that status 
differences inhibit coalitional action less in a face-to-face context. 
 
Method 
 
Procedures 
 
 Two independent variables were manipulated in a two-by-two factorial design: status 
differences (same versus different) between subordinates, and the form of communication (face-
to-face versus intercom) between subordinates. A total of 36 triads (9 per cell) were randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental treatments. Each triad contained two subjects (i.e., 
subordinates) and a confederate (i.e., leader). Male, undergraduate volunteers at the University of 
Iowa served as subjects. 
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 The task. Initially, the two subjects and the confederate were placed in separate rooms 
and were given Part One of the written instructions. These instructions explained that their task 
was to make accurate spatial judgments, and that their group earns money depending on their 
task performance. The task consisted of judging the proportion of darkened area on black and 
white cards. As documented in prior research, the ambiguity of this task permits fictitious 
feedback and enables the establishment of a bogus status hierarchy (Michener and Lawler, 1971; 
Michener and Lyons, 1972; Lawler, 1975). 
 The status hierarchy. From these instructions, subjects also learned that a status hierarchy 
would be established to facilitate the group’s performance. The status hierarchy was ostensibly 
based on group members’ relative task competence, as measured by a test. After reading Part 
One of the instructions, each subject (and the confederate) took a judgment test consisting of 
spatial judgments similar to those required on the aforementioned task. During the judgment test, 
all three persons (two subjects and one confederate) were brought together in one room. This was 
the only face-to-face contact subjects had with the confederate during the experiment. After they 
finished the test, subjects returned to their private rooms and awaited the results. At this point, 
the confederate secretly departed. All further communication from the confederate (i.e., group 
leader) to the subjects was fabricated by the experimenter. The brief presence of the confederate 
verified for subjects the existence of three persons in the group. 
 The experimenter gave subjects fictitious test feedback which manipulated the status 
variable. Each person was assigned a status weight. These status weights allegedly symbolized 
subjects’ relative task competence and indicated the weight (i.e., influence) to be given each 
person’s judgment when group scores were computed. Subjects understood that the experimenter 
used these weights when computing the group score. 
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 The status weights were presented as percents, with a total of 100% allocated to the 
group. In all experimental conditions, the confederate was assigned the highest status weight 
(i.e., 40%) and became the group leader. In the status-similarity condition, both subordinates (SI 
and S2) received status weights of 30%; while in the status-difference condition S1 received 35% 
and S2 received 25%. The written forms, manipulating status, were completed in advance of the 
experiment and packaged so that the experimenter would remain unaware of the experimental 
condition at this point. 
 The leader’s prerogatives. After they received their prearranged status weights, subjects 
read Part Two of the written instructions. These instructions explained that the leader divides the 
group’s money among its members. The leader could divide the winnings in any manner, and 
could even keep all of the money for himself. Therefore, from the subjects’ standpoint, the leader 
had the greatest task ability, the greatest control over the group’s task decisions, and complete 
discretion over the division of the group’s winnings. The leader’s reward prerogatives were used 
to set the inequity parameter at a low level, and to provide the leader with the capacity to 
retaliate against a coalition by usurping larger amounts of the group winnings on future trials. 
 The coalition. The instructions indicated that the subordinates could coalesce (if they 
wished) by signing a formal agreement. Subjects were informed that they need not coalesce and 
that the coalition opportunity was merely a way to assure them some influence in the group. If 
formed, a coalition could destroy up to 50% of the leader’s winnings, but could not change his 
status weight or deprive him of the prerogative of allocating the group’s winnings on future 
trials. Any money destroyed by a coalition was taken from the leader and returned to the 
experimenter. Like strikes, work slowdowns, sick-ins, and so on, coalitions in this study are 
outcome-blockage tactics-meaning they reduce the flow of outcomes to the target without 
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directly and immediately enriching coalition members. (See Michener and Suchner, 1972, for a 
general discussion of outcome-blockage tactics.) Such coalitions are influence tactics that might 
succeed, fail, or elicit retaliation, depending on the response of the target to coalitional action. A 
coalition could be negotiated during the S1-S2 discussion which occurred after the leader 
allocated the group rewards. The context of this discussion manipulated the form of 
communication variable. The S1-S2 discussion was the only time the subordinates could 
communicate with each other. During all other parts of the experiment they were in separate 
rooms and could not communicate. 
 Trial sequence. The experiment consisted of one trial, but subjects believed there were 
four. Telling subjects there were more trials was important because it impelled subordinates to 
consider the long-term consequences of coalitional action as well as the prospect of leader 
retaliation. At the beginning of the trial, subjects judged five black-and-white cards, while in 
separate rooms. Next, the experimenter collected these individual judgments and ostensibly 
combined them into a group score with a “weighting chart” allocating influence proportional to 
the status weights. 
 Four minutes later, the experimenter announced bogus results over the intercom. All 
groups were told they won $1.80 out of a possible $2.00, which represented a high level of group 
success. Feedback on individual performance indicated that individual performance was similar 
to member’s test performance. In conjunction with the announcement of these bogus results, the 
experimenter instructed the leader (over the intercom so subjects could hear) to complete a form 
dividing the group’s money. The experimenter then gave this prefabricated form, which set the 
inequity parameter, to the subordinates. Across all conditions, the leader kept 50% of the money 
for himself, which was more than that legitimized by his status weight of 40%. In the status-
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similarity condition, both subordinates were given 25%, which was 5% less than their status 
weight legitimized; in the status-difference condition, S1 was given 30% and S2 was given 20%, 
which was also 5% less than subordinates’ status weights (35% and 25%, respectively). In both 
the status-similarity and status-difference conditions, each subordinate received 5% less than that 
suggested by his status weight. 
 After subjects digested the information on the “money distribution form,” they completed 
the mid-questionnaire, containing measures of pertinent cognitive variables (e.g., attitudes 
toward coalitional action, perceived similarity of interests). On completion of this questionnaire, 
subordinates could engage in a discussion for up to five minutes. In the face-to-face condition, 
they were placed in one room for the discussion; while in the intercom condition, they merely 
remained in their private rooms and talked over an intercom. This discussion provided subjects 
with the opportunity to discuss the progress of the group and to negotiate a coalitional agreement 
that would destroy a portion of the leader’s winnings. 
 After the discussion period, subordinates completed the postexperimental questionnaire. 
While completing this questionnaire, subjects believed that there were still more trials. Subjects 
were then debriefed and paid two dollars. 
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Dependent Measures 
 
 To form a coalition, subordinates filled out a “S1-S2 Coalition” form which stated: 
On this trial, S1 and S2 agree to reduce the money the leader received by ___________ 
per cent. 
S1’s initials_______ 
S2’s initials_______ 
This form was available to subjects throughout the discussion. A coalition occurred only when 
S1 and S2 agreed on the percent reduction in the leader’s outcomes and initialed the form. 
 The frequency variable was measured by merely coding whether or not a coalition 
formed, and hence could assume a value of zero or one. The severity of action provides a more 
sensitive indicator of coalitional action and was measured by the percent reduction in the leader’s 
winnings. Subordinates could destroy up to 50% of the leader’s winnings, so the range of this 
variable was zero to fifty. When coalitions did not form, severity was coded as zero. 
 Questionnaires (mid- and post-) provide information on the success of the status 
manipulation and on other cognitive variables. In addition, subordinate discussions were tape-
recorded (unbeknown to subjects) and verbal statements in the early phase of the discussions 
were coded as follows: (1) who made the statement (SI and S2), and (2) what was the statement 
(i.e., question, “definition of situation,” coalition proposal). The severity of the first coalition 
proposal was coded from zero to fifty, with zero indicating a proposal not to form a coalition. 
The response to the first proposal was coded as agree or disagree. The questionnaire and 
interaction data are used to interpret the impact of the independent variables on coalition 
behavior. 
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 The person who coded the interaction data knew that the study had something to do with 
coalitions, but was unaware of the manipulations or hypotheses. As a check on intercoder 
reliability, a second person (also unaware of the hypotheses) coded the data, and the average 
agreement between coders was 92% (range 86% to 97%) for verbal statements and 85% (range 
82% to 92%) for identification of who made the verbal statements. The coefficients of intercoder 
agreement (𝜋𝜋) averaged .83 for verbal statements and .75 for the identification data, which 
reflect a reasonable degree of intercoder reliability. 
 
Results 
 
 As indicated by postquestionnaire data, the status manipulation was successfully induced. 
One question asked subjects, “How dissimilar are the status weights of S1 and S2?” and a second 
one asked, “How dissimilar are the monetary winnings of S1 and S2?” In the status-difference 
condition, both subordinates perceived their status weights (for S1: 𝐹𝐹 =  80.02,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .001; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  38.04,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .001) and monetary rewards (for S1: 
𝐹𝐹 =  22.98,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < 001; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  128.76,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32, 𝑝𝑝 < .001) as more 
different than in the status-similarity condition. Moreover, subordinates saw differential status 
weight as a legitimation for differential monetary payoffs, which documents the credibility of the 
status weights. A question on the postexperimental questionnaire asked, “How do you think the 
leader should distribute the winnings among members of the group?” There was no difference 
between subordinates’ judgment of what the leader deserved across status conditions (F’s<  1). 
However, S1 was seen as deserving a larger portion of the group’s winnings in the status-
difference condition (where S1 had higher status) titan in the status-similarity condition (for S1: 
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𝐹𝐹 =  110.11,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .001; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  60.02, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .001); and S2 was 
viewed as deserving less in the status-difference condition where S2 had the lowest status weight 
(for S1: 𝐹𝐹 =  22.51,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .001; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  11.95, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .01). Clearly, 
the status manipulation was effective, and appropriate conditions were established for a test of 
the study hypothesis. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
 
Coalition Behavior 
 
 Table 1 presents the mean severity of coalitional action for each experimental condition. 
An analysis of variance reveals two main effects. As predicted, a status-difference main effect 
indicates that the severity of coalitional action was less when potential allies had different, as 
opposed to the same, status in the larger group (𝐹𝐹 =  8.33,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .007). A form of 
communication main effect indicates that the severity of action was less in the face-to-face 
condition than in the intercom condition (𝐹𝐹 =  4.72,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .04). The interaction 
effect is not statistically significant (𝐹𝐹 =  1.49, n.s.). Thus, both status differences and face-to-
face communication constrained the severity of coalitional action.2 
                                                          
2 When the cases where coalitions did not form (i.e., zero severity) are excluded, the difference 
between the means in the status conditions and between those in the communication conditions 
are nearly identical to the difference between the marginals in Table 1. If one excludes the zero 
cases, the mean severity in the status-similarity condition is 23.7 compared to 13.8 in the status-
difference condition, which are statistically significant differences (𝑡𝑡 =  2.64,𝑝𝑝 < .01). 
Similarly, the mean severity in the face-to-face condition is 14.3 compared to 23.6 in the 
intercom condition, and these differences are also statistically significant (𝑡𝑡 =  2.46,𝑝𝑝 < .025). 
However, the instances of zero severity should be included in the analysis (as in Table 1) 
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 The coalition frequency provides a secondary indicator of coalitional activity. Table 2 
contains the percentage of coalitions formed by experimental condition. Although the results are 
in the expected direction for the status variable, an analysis of variance does not reveal 
significant effects for either status differences (𝐹𝐹 = 1.94,𝑝𝑝 < .17) or form of communication 
(𝐹𝐹 <  𝑙𝑙).3 Status differences did not prevent the actual formation of coalitions. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
Attitudes Toward Coalitional Action 
 
 The mid-questionnaire, administered before collection of behavioral data, contains 
information on subordinates’ attitudes toward coalitional action. Recall that S1 and S2 have 
equal status in the status-similarity condition and that S1 has higher and S2 has lower status in 
the status-difference condition. One question simply asked persons the extent to which they 
favored a coalition. Subjects answered on a nine-point scale, and an analysis of variance shows 
different results for S1 and S2. As anticipated, the subordinate with the least status in the status-
                                                          
because deciding not to form a coalition is clearly a zero-severity decision. Furthermore, in 
natural settings, decisions on the nature of coalitional action (e.g., such as severity) are 
seemingly the critical issues in coalitional negotiations, and inseparable from mere decisions to 
join forces. It is inconceivable that parties would form a coalition without agreement on the 
nature of action to which they are committing themselves. 
3 One might question the use of analysis of variance on a frequency variable that can only take 
on values of zero or one. This is likely to violate the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity. However, it should be noted that (1) the F-test is robust with respect to these 
assumptions as long as the cell sizes are equal (Kirk, 1968: 60-61)-a condition that is satisfied in 
the present study; and (2), there is evidence that the use of analysis of variance on dichotomous 
dependent variables yields results virtually identical to those obtained by nonparametric 
alternatives (Seeger and Gabrielsson, 1968; Gabrielsson and Seeger, 1971). 
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difference condition (i.e., S2) favored a coalition less than in the status-similarity condition (𝐹𝐹 = 6.31,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .025); however, the status did not affect S1’s inclination toward 
coalescing even though he had higher status than S2 in the status-difference condition (𝐹𝐹 <  1). 
 Another item on the mid-questionnaire asked subordinates to indicate how much of the 
leader’s winnings they wished to destroy. Subjects responded by inserting a percent (i.e., 0% to 
50%). Both subordinates favored destroying less in the status-difference, than in the status-
similarity condition (for S1: 𝐹𝐹 =  5.84,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .025; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  7.25,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/32,𝑝𝑝 < .01). In sum, status differences inhibited the severity of action advocated by both 
subordinates, while divergent status reduced only S2’s inclination toward coalition formation. 
 
Discussion 
 
 In Dahrendorfs (1959) terms, the results identify two factors that constrain the violence of 
interest-group action (i.e., coalitions) by quasi-group members (i.e., subordinates): status 
differences and face-to- face communication.4 
 Status differences. The status-difference effect extends the Vitz and Kite (1970) and 
Lawler (1975) studies. The status conditions in the present study are comparable to the low 
versus moderate resource differences in the Vitz and Kite study, and Vitz and Kite found that 
moderate resource differences reduced the mutual defense fund established by allies to combat 
an adversary. Similarly, in the present study, status differences reduced the severity of coalitional 
aggression against an inequitable group leader. Thus, the Vitz and Kite (1970) findings on 
                                                          
4 See note 1. 
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resource differences in an internation setting evidently generalize to status differences between 
subordinates in a stratified group. 
 A recent experimental study of coalitions did not find a status-difference effect under 
conditions of extreme inequity (Lawler, 1975). The present study shows that status differences 
inhibit the severity of coalitional action under conditions of “mild” inequity. A lower level of 
inequity apparently does not involve enough provocation to unite subordinates in severe action 
when they occupy different status levels in the group. 
 Bilateral conciliation accounts for the status-differences effect on coalitional severity. 
When they had different status, subordinates were aware of a potential “conflict of interest,” and 
they adopted a conciliatory stance in which both took account of their divergent interests and 
moderated their opinions and proposals on coalitional action. Questionnaire and interaction data 
reveal little overt conflict between subordinates, but support bilateral conciliation as an 
interpretation for the status-difference effect. Data bearing on tills interpretation are discussed 
below. 
 A question on the mid-questionnaire (administered before the subordinate discussions) 
indicates that status differences aroused perceptions of more divergent interests than status 
similarity. The question asked, “In your opinion, how similar or opposed are your interests and 
(other: S1/S2)?” Both subordinates viewed their interests as less similar when they had different 
status in the group (for S1: 𝐹𝐹 =  4.38,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .05; for S2: 𝐹𝐹 =  6.61,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .01). As expected, subordinates were more cognizant of a potential “conflict of 
interest” in the status-difference condition. 
 Questionnaire and interaction data (from subordinate discussions) suggest that both 
subordinates adopted a conciliatory stance in response to tills potential conflict of interest. First, 
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as reported in the results section, both subordinates favored undertaking less severe action in the 
status- difference condition than in the status-similarity condition. Second, and more important, 
the first proposal (i.e., 0% to 50%) in the discussion was less severe in the status-difference 
condition regardless of which subordinate made the proposal (𝐹𝐹 =  10.71,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/31,𝑝𝑝 <.005). Moreover, the severity of the first proposal is highly related to the actual severity of 
coalitional agreements. A regression of the severity of coalitional agreements on the severity of 
the first proposal, controlling for status differences and form of communication, yields a 
standardized regression coefficient of 𝑏𝑏∗ =  .84 for the severity of the first proposal; 
furthermore, the impact of status differences on coalitional agreements disappears (𝑏𝑏∗ = −.04), 
suggesting that the status effect is totally mediated by the initial proposal. The initial proposals 
apparently set the tone for the discussion and provided a base line around which minimal 
variation occurred when coalitional agreements were constructed. 
 Other data corroborate the importance of initial proposals (and, by implication, bilateral 
conciliation) in accounting for the status effect on severity. The response to the first proposal 
(regardless of who made the response) was more likely to be agreement when subordinates had 
different, as opposed to the same, status in the group (𝑥𝑥2 = 4.35,𝑝𝑝 < .05). Some form of 
disagreement (e.g., counterproposals, expression of doubt, questioning the reason for the 
proposal) was actually more likely when subordinates had the same group status. Being 
cognizant of a potential conflict of interest, subordinates in the status-difference condition 
apparently took steps to avoid overt conflict or disagreement. 
 In sum, status differences induced bilateral conciliation which reduced the severity of 
coalitional action. Under status differences, the subordinate with higher status was apparently 
willing to coalesce, but to take only mild action against the group leader; while the subordinate 
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with the least status expected less support for the coalition from the higher status subordinate 
(𝐹𝐹 =  4.76,𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  1/32,𝑝𝑝 <  .05) and may have advocated less severe action to elicit such 
support. This mutual accommodation of subordinates in the status-difference condition 
engendered coalition formation, but reduced the severity of action. 
 Form of communication. The communication main effect indicates that the severity of 
coalitional agreements was less under conditions of face-to-face communication than under 
intercom communication. This finding may reflect greater self-presentational concern by 
potential allies when their initial encounter is face-to-face, regardless of their relative status. 
Being more sensitive to the impressions they give off, subordinates may have cautiously 
approached face-to-face discussions and may have probed each other’s opinions before making 
concrete proposals. Such mutual caution would produce less risky and more moderate coalitional 
agreements. 
 Some interaction data support the notion that subordinates exercised greater caution 
under face-to-face communication than with intercom communication. The opening statement in 
the discussion was coded into two categories: definition of situation or coalition proposal. A 
definitional statement involved any judgment or definition concerning the group or its leader 
(e.g., a statement that the reward distribution is unfair), which did not contain a coalition 
proposal. Any statement which included a coalition proposal (e.g., don’t form, form, and so 
forth), even when combined with a definitional statement, was coded as a proposal. The data 
indicate that the opening statement (regardless of who made it) was more likely to be a definition 
in the face-to-face condition than in the intercom condition (𝑥𝑥2 = 6.41,𝑝𝑝 < .01). Thus, 
subordinates in the face-to-face condition were more likely to probe the feelings of the other by 
offering a definition of the situation before making explicit proposals; while in the intercom 
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condition subordinates were more likely to lead off with a concrete proposal which, of course, 
presupposed a particular definition. This suggests a more cautious approach in the initial phases 
of face-to-face encounters, which may account for the form of communication main effect. This 
interpretation, however, must be viewed as tentative because the nature of the first statement did 
not significantly affect the severity of coalitional agreements (𝑡𝑡 =  1.26, N.S.), though the 
means are in the expected direction. 
  
The Impact of Status Differences        21 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
  
The Impact of Status Differences        22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
 
  
The Impact of Status Differences        23 
 
References 
 
Barker, L. J. and D. Janseiwicz (1970) “Coalitions in the civil rights movement,” in S. 
Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and M. Lieserson (eds.) The Study of Coalition Behavior. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Brown, B. (1968) “The effects of need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining.” J. of 
Experimental Social Psychology 4: 107-122. 
Caplow, T. (1968) Two Against One. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Dahrendorf, R. (1959) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford Univ. 
Press. 
Gabrielsson, A. And P. Seeger (1971) “Tests of significance in two-way designs (mixed model) 
with dichotomous data.” British J. of Mathematical and Stat. Psychology 24: 111-116. 
Gamson, W. A. (1964) “Experimental studies of coalition formation,” in L. Berkowitz (ed.) 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, VoL I. New York: Academic Press. 
Goffman, I. (1963) Behavior in Public Places. New York: Free Press. 
------ (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday Books. 
Kirk, R. E. (1968) Experimental Design: Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences. Belmont, 
Calif.: Brooks/Cole. ' 
Komorita, S. S. And J. Chertkoff (1973) “A bargaining theory of coalition formation.” Psych. 
Rev. 80: 149-162. 
Lawler, E. J. (1975) “An experimental study of factors affecting the mobilization or 
revolutionary coalitions.” Sociometry 38: 163-179. 
The Impact of Status Differences        24 
 
Michener, H. A. And E. J. Lawler (1971) “Revolutionary coalition strength and collective failure 
as determinants of status reallocation.” J. of Experimental Social Psychology 8: 180-195.  
Michener, H. A. And M. Lyons (1972) “Perceived support and upward mobility as determinants 
of revolutionary coalitional behavior.” J. of Experimental Social Psychology 8: 180-195. 
Michener, H. A. And R. W. Suchner (1972) “The tactical use of social power,” in J. T. Tedeschi 
(ed.) The Social Influence Processes. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 
Nitz, L. H. And J. H. Phillips (1969) ‘The effects of divisibility of payoff on confederative 
behavior.” J. of Conflict Resolution 13: 382-387. 
Seeger, P. And A. Gabrielsson (1968) “Applicability of the Cochran Q test and the f test for 
statistical analysis of dichotomous data for dependent samples.” Psych. Bull. 69: 269-
277. • 
Vitz, P. C. And W. R. Kite (1970) “Factors affecting conflict and negotiation within an alliance.” 
J. of Experimental Social Psychology 6: 233-247. 
Wichman, H. (1970) “Effect of isolation and communication on cooperation in a two-person 
game.” J. of Personality and Sodal Psychology 16: 114-120. 
 
 
